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ARTICLE
Modelling the history of early modern natural
philosophy: the fate of the art-nature distinction in
the Dutch universities
Andrea Sangiacomo
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, Groningen, the Netherlands
ABSTRACT
The ‘model approach’ facilitates a quantitative-oriented study of conceptual
changes in large corpora. This paper implements the ‘model approach’ to
investigate the erosion of the traditional art-nature distinction in early modern
natural philosophy. I argue that a condition for this transformation has to
be located in the late scholastic conception of ﬁnal causation. I design
a conceptual model to capture the art-nature distinction and formulate a
working hypothesis about its early modern fate. I test my hypothesis on a
selected corpus of 25 works published in the Dutch academic milieu between
1607 and 1748. I analyse the corpus through a procedure based on
concordancing of keywords associated with the model. I argue that the
results obtained constitute a successful pilot study for the implementation of
the model approach on larger scale research.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 29 June 2017; Revised 28 October 2017, 27 February and 24 June 2018;
Accepted 13 July 2018
KEYWORDS Model approach; art-nature distinction; natural philosophy; Aristotelian philosophy;
Mechanical philosophy
What is the reading of a text, in fact, except the recording of certain thematic
recurrences, certain insistences of forms and meanings?
Italo Calvino, If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller
1. The model approach
In a series of recent papers, Arianna Betti andHein van den Berg (‘Modelling the
History of Ideas’ and ‘Towards a Computational History of Ideas’) advocated
what they call the ‘model approach’ to the history of ideas. By ‘models’ they
mean ‘fully explicit and revisable interpretive frameworks or networks of
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concepts developed by the historians of ideas themselves’ (Betti and van den
Berg, ‘Towards a Computational History of Ideas’). Models are heuristic and
interpretative devices that can be used to study the transformation of philoso-
phical concepts and ideas across time. The model approach has a number of
methodological advantages, amongwhich are (1) the fact that it makes explicit
the background assumptions that guide the historian in assessing hermaterial,
thereby facilitating the possibility of uncovering biases or falsifying historical
hypothesis; and (2) makes it possible to process large corpora and analyse con-
ceptual change over time in ways that would be diﬃcult (if not impossible) to
pursue with traditional close reading or individual case studies.1
In this paper, I apply the model approach to the domain of the history of
early modern natural philosophy. In particular, I focus on the fate of the Aris-
totelian art-nature distinction across the seventeenth and the mid-eighteenth
centuries.2 This period has often been associated with the eﬀort of several
novatores to conceptualize the natural world as a sort of clockwork, in
which natural phenomena could be accounted for in terms of matter in
motion only, as in the case of artiﬁcial mechanical engines. This early
modern mechanistic picture of nature was at odds with the traditional scho-
lastic framework. Building on this contraposition, the master narrative of the
seventeenth-century ‘Scientiﬁc Revolution’ (Butterﬁeld, The Origins of
Modern Science; Koyré, From the Closed World to the Inﬁnite Universe; Rupert
Hall, The Scientiﬁc Revolution, 1500–1800; Westfall, ‘The Scientiﬁc Revolution
of the Seventeenth Century’) portrayed a radical break between the early
modern period and the previous scholastic tradition.
The issue of mechanization is an important example of the broader histor-
iographical shift which has occurred in the last four decades of scholarship
about early modern philosophy and science. By problematizing the narrative
about the Scientiﬁc Revolution, most of today’s historians tend to stress the
continuities between the early modern and the late medieval period (e.g.
Laird and Roux (eds.), Mechanics and Natural Philosophy before the Scientiﬁc
Revolution; Ariew, Descartes and the First Cartesians). Moreover, they empha-
size the complexity and multiplicity of diﬀerent (and often irreducible)
views that characterize both the novatores (Garber, ‘Remarks on the Pre-
History of the Mechanical Philosophy’) and the scholastics themselves (Leijen-
horst, Lüthy and Thijssen, ‘The Erosion of Aristotelianism’). Part of this histor-
iographical shift has been motivated by the broadening of the historical
canon (Zinsser, Men, Women, and the Birthing of Modern Science) and by a
1The use of the model approach contributes to the integration of more quantitative methods in philos-
ophy and history of philosophy. See, e.g. Bluhm, ‘Corpus Analysis in Philosophy’ about the use of
corpus linguistics methods for the study of natural language in contemporary philosophy of language.
For the role of quantitative approaches in detecting and correcting biases in contemporary philosophical
research, see Polonioli, ‘A Plea for Minimally Biased Empirical Philosophy’.
2The model approach has been implemented so far for the study of axiomatic systems, see De Jong and
Betti, ‘The Classical Model of Science’.
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more serious consideration of the role played by a number of scholastic
authors operating in the university context (Schmitt, Aristotle and the Renais-
sance). Today’s scholarship suggests that seemingly traditionalist ﬁgures such
as university professors paved the way for the acceptance and dissemination
of the apparently new positions introduced by several early modern natural
philosophers (Sgarbi, The Aristotelian Tradition and the Rise of British Empiri-
cism; Craig, Subverting Aristotle). With regard to the speciﬁc issue of mechan-
ization of the natural world, this new historiographical attitude supports two
connected claims: (1) mechanization was in fact far less dominant than early
accounts of the Scientiﬁc Revolution suggested (Duchesneau, Les modèles du
vivant de Descartes à Leibniz; Graukroger, The Collapse of Mechanism and the
Rise of Sensibility); (2) the early modern endorsement of a new mechanist
account of the natural world should be understood alongside the conceptual
frameworks developed by late scholastic authors (Hattab, Descartes on Forms
and Mechanisms).
In this paper, I implement the model approach in order to provide further
evidence for the current view that early modern transformations in natural
philosophy (such as the dismissal of the art-nature distinction and the
mechanization of nature) are better understood if assessed in connection
with the problems left open in the scholastic framework. At the same time,
I argue that implementing the model approach has three distinct beneﬁts.
First, themodel approach oﬀers a promising way of testing current scholarly
assumptions and insights by exploring new (and potentially broader) historical
corpora. One of themajor problems of themaster narrative about the Scientiﬁc
Revolution is that it relies on undue generalizations based on the consideration
of a few canonical ﬁgures. The model approach appears to be a suitable meth-
odological antidote to this problem. It allows for the veriﬁcation and expansion
of the domain of validity of historical hypotheses to more comprehensive and
representative (but still vastly unstudied) corpora. For instance, the erasing of
the art-nature distinction is often considered to be a mark of the ‘new’
natural philosophy (Dijksterhuis, De mechanisering van het wereldbeeld; West-
fall, ‘The Scientiﬁc Revolution of the Seventeenth Century’; Shapin, The Scientiﬁc
Revolution, 30–46). By implementing the model approach to study a still unex-
plored early modern corpus, I investigate whether, and to what extent, the
authors included in this corpus actually dismissed this distinction. Moreover,
I use the model approach to determine if and how this dismissal relates to rel-
evant conceptual changes in the established scholastic framework.
Second, the model approach has distinctive heuristic advantages insofar as
it draws attention to a number of apparently non-standard positions and
authors that would be worthy of further close investigation, but who are
not easily detected by more traditional historiographical approaches.
Third, since the model approach tends to produce quantitative results
about the frequency at which certain claims are instantiated, it generates a
48 A. SANGIACOMO
new array of research questions. These questions would not only be worth
exploring but would also require (in order to be successfully answered) a
more signiﬁcant integration of quantitative methods and tools in the still
mostly qualitative approach of most historians of philosophy and science. In
this sense, the implementation of the model approach can work as a meth-
odological catalyst for a more thorough development and integration of
quantitative methods in the history of philosophy and science (Laubichler,
Maienschein and Renn, ‘Computational Perspectives in the History of
Science’).
I proceed as follows. Section two introduces my model for studying the dis-
missal of the traditional art-nature distinction. Section three presents the
implementation of the model in the case study of a selected corpus of
works published in the Dutch Republic between 1607 and 1748. Section
four outlines an agenda for further research.
2. Modelling the late scholastic conception of physical reality
The second book of Aristotle’s Physics begins with the following distinction:
Of things that exist, some exist by nature, some from other causes. By nature the
animals and their parts exist, and the plants and the simple bodies (earth, ﬁre, air,
water)—for we say that these and the like exist by nature. All the things men-
tioned plainly diﬀer from things which are not constituted by nature. For each
of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in
respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration). On the
other hand, a bed and a coat and anything else of that sort, qua receiving
these designations—i.e. in so far as they are products of art—have no innate
impulse to change.
(Physics, II.1 192b)
In this passage, Aristotle suggests that natural beings have an internal prin-
ciple of change, while other beings (such as ‘a bed and a coat and anything
else of that sort’) do not. In this respect, natural beings are different from arti-
ﬁcial beings (or products of art), whose changes are always brought about by
principles external to them.
In the late sixteenth century, the famous Jesuit Coninbricenses’ commen-
tary on Aristotle’s Physics echoes that one of the main reasons why nature
diﬀers from art is that:
[B]ecause natural forms are causally active and ‘alive’ (so to say), while forms pro-
duced by art are as if they were inert and dead, and do not have any eﬃcaceous
force […]. And from this it follows that natural things can have in themselves a
principle of motion and rest, while things produced by art (as such) cannot.3
3[De Goìs] Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu In octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae,
280 (my translation): “quia formae naturales sunt actuosae, et quasi vivae: formae vero arte factorum
BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 49
The Coninmbricenses, however, also introduce a number of further discussions
that do not have clear parallels in Aristotle’s original text but rather engage with
the long history of receptions, interpretations and debates that surrounded it.
For instance, discussing how ﬁnal causes operate and which conditions they
require in order to cause their effects, the Conimbricenses state that ‘objective
being is the condition sine qua non for the end tomove.’4 In this context, ‘objec-
tive being’ refers to the object’s way of being in the subject’s mental apprehen-
sion of it. Thus, the fact that the agent cognizes or mentally apprehends the end
is a necessary condition for ﬁnal causality to take place. The idea that acting for
an end requires some form of cognition (call this the ‘cognition condition’) is a
genuine scholastic innovation (Pasnau, ‘Intentionality and Final Causes’, Schmid,
‘Teleology and the Dispositional Theory of Causation in Thomas Aquinas’, San-
giacomo, ‘Aristotle, Heereboord and the Polemical Target of Spinoza’s Critique
of Final Causes’).
Reconstructing the history of the cognition condition (and the reasons that
led to its acceptance) goes far beyond the limits of this paper. For present pur-
poses, I would like to stress that late scholastic authors were committed to the
following three claims: (i) the original Aristotelian art-nature distinction, based
on the presence of an internal principle of change in natural beings; (ii) the
fact that natural beings operate for an end; and (iii) the cognition condition,
according to which only agents that cognize their ends can operate for the
sake of these ends in virtue of their own nature or internal principle of change.
While Aristotle himself would subscribe to the ﬁrst two commitments, he
would reject the third (Sangiacomo, ‘Aristotle, Heereboord and the Polemical
Target of Spinoza’s Critique of Final Causes’). I shall call the account that results
from the conjunction of these three main commitments the ‘late scholastic con-
ception of physical reality’.
I propose to capture the way in which these three main commitments (i-iii)
are connected in the late scholastic conception of physical reality by using the
following model M, which consists of the conjunction of two members (M1
and M2). Following Kuukkanen (‘Making Sense of Conceptual Change’) I dis-
tinguish between the ‘core’ and the ‘margins’ of a concept. The core
deﬁnes the fundamental features of a concept that all historical instances of
that concept ought to instantiate. The margins deﬁne additional notions
that can be determined or ways in which certain notions can be qualiﬁed in
various ways in diﬀerent historical instances without introducing a substantial
change to the core of the concept. In my model, core notions are marked in
bold, while marginal notions are marked in italics.5 My model reads as follows:
tanquam stolidae et emortuae, nullam eﬀectricem vim habentes […]. Atque hinc est, quod res naturales
possunt habere in se motionis et quietis principium; arte factae vero, qua tales, non item.”
4[De Goìs] Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu In octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae,
410 (my translation): “esse objectivum est conditio, sine qua ﬁnis non movet.”
5I use this convention introduced by Betti and van den Berg, ‘Towards a Computational History of Ideas’.
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Late scholastic conception of physical reality (M):
M1. All physical beings are subject to change (either by producing changes in
other beings or by undergoing changes in themselves).
a. If a physical being has an internal principle of change, then the physical
being is a product of nature.
b. If a physical being has only an external principle of change, then the phys-
ical being is a product of art.
M2. All changes of physical beings aim to an end.
a. If the physical being is able to cognize the end for the sake of which the
change is brought about, then the change is caused by the physical
being’s internal principle.
b. If the physical being is not able to cognize the end for the sake of which the
change is brought about, then the change is caused by a principle that is
external to the physical being.
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
The ﬁrst member (M1a-b) models the ﬁrst commitment of the late scholas-
tic account, namely, the traditional Aristotelian art-nature distinction. This dis-
tinction is sharp insofar as no physical being can simultaneously satisfy both
conditions of M1 (because something that has only an external principle of
change cannot have also an internal principle and vice versa). The second
member (M2) introduces the second commitment, namely, the idea that all
physical beings operate for an end. The ‘cognition condition’ (M2a) captures
the third commitment, which requires that the agent must cognize its ends in
order to consider that agent as internally determined to operate for the sake
of those ends. If the agent does not satify the cognition condition, then it
should be considered as directed by some external agent (M2b).
Model M seems to work smoothly in the case of some kinds of physical
being. For instance, human beings are physical beings that count as products
of nature (M1a) because they have an internal principle of change, and they
are also able to cognize their ends (M2a), since they are capable of knowledge
and cognitive self-direction. M also successfully captures the case of artefacts
and products of human crafts, which are physical beings that do not have an
internal principle of change (M1b) and that are not able to cognize their ends
(M2b).
However, there is also a class of physical beings that constitute a potential
counterexample to M. This class includes inanimate natural beings, plants and
(depending on the authors’ commitments) non-human animals. This class of
physical beings is of central importance to natural philosophy, which is the
early modern discipline that studies both inanimate and animate natural
beings (usually excluding human beings as such). These physical beings see-
mingly have an internal principle of change (which explains their ‘natural’
operations, such as natural movements and growth), although they are also
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seemingly deprived of cognition. Being deprived of cognition, these physical
beings should be considered as directed by an external principle of change
(M2b). However, this conclusion has repercussions for the qualiﬁcation of
these beings as ‘natural’ (M1a). Since all the changes endured by these phys-
ical beings aim towards an end (M2), and these changes have an external prin-
ciple (because of their lack of cognition, M2b), it follows that all the changes of
these physical beings are brought about by an external principle. Hence, they
should be counted as ‘artiﬁcial’ (M1b) rather than ‘natural’ beings (M1a).
My working hypothesis aims to tackle the way in which historical authors
respond to this counterexample. I assume that authors have two main alterna-
tives: (a) they do not alter the core notions or conditions of model M but make
only adjustments in the marginal notions in order to accommodate the coun-
terexample with the model; (b) they alter some core notions or committments
of model M in order to accommodate the counterexample. Since changes in
the marginal notions do not entail a radical conceptual change in the late
scholastic conception of physical reality, I shall refer to this ﬁrst option as ‘tra-
ditional’, while I refer to the second option (which involves some core concep-
tual changes in M) as ‘non traditional’. Let me articulate both options.
(a) A defender of the traditional option can solve the problem posed by the
counterexample by distinguishing between diﬀerent kinds of change and
their relative principles on the basis of the diﬀerent kinds of causality involved.
When referring to the kind of change relevant to whether a physical being is
natural or artiﬁcial (M1), one may assume that this has to be a change related
to formal and eﬃcient causality. Natural beings have an internal principle of
change in the sense that the changes they produce as formal or eﬃcient
causes depend on their own internal principle. For instance, the fact that a
plant structures its material components in a certain way or grows in a
certain direction depends on the plant’s substantial form, which is usually con-
sidered to be an internal principle of change (since it is the principle that
inheres in the plant itself and deﬁnes its nature). However, when it comes
to the change related to the physical being’s acting for an end (M2), this
kind of change concerns ﬁnal causality.
A supporter of the traditonal account can deny that the same agent that
counts (M1a) as a natural being and operates as a formal and eﬃcient
cause in virtue of an internal principle of (formal and eﬃcient) change must
also satisfy the cognition condition (M2a). In order to satisfy the commitment
according to which all natural beings act for an end, it is suﬃcient that some
other agent directs these natural beings that lack cognition towards their end
(M2b). The most widespread solution is to maintain that God providentially
guides and concurs with those agents that lack cognition (Des Chene, Physio-
logia, 194–200). In this case, an agent lacking cognition is still operating
towards an end (M2) although not in virtue of its own internal principle
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(M2a), but somehow by proxy and in virtue of the direct intervention of an
external agent (M2b).
This traditional solution does not entail a change in any of the core notions
or commitments of the late scholastic conception of physical reality (M).
Rather, it accommodates the counterexample by distinguishing between
diﬀerent kinds of change and adding a further qualiﬁcation to the marginal
notion of change that features in the model (by making possible the combi-
nation of M1a and M2b, which was challenged by the counterexample).
The kind of change involved in the cognition condition (M2a) concerns ﬁnal
causation, while the kind of change involved in the art-nature distinction
(M1) concerns formal and eﬃcient causation. Hence the same agent can
have an internal principle of (formal and eﬃcient) change (M1a) while
having also an external principle of (ﬁnal) change (M2b). For instance, a
plant has an internal principle of change (i.e. its substantial form) with
respect to its phyiscal structure, growth and biological processes, while it
has an external principle (i.e. God) insofar as the plant cannot actually
cognize its ends and thus has to be directed towards them by an agent
who cognizes them.6 Having both internal and external principles of change
(when these principles relate to diﬀerent kinds of change) is compatible
with being a natural physical being (M1a).
While this traditional solution does not require a change in the core notions
of the late scholastic conception of physical reality, it does come with some
costs and ultimately shifts the problem from the model itself to the overall
scholastic account of the way in which diﬀerent kinds of causation are
related together. Let me brieﬂy elaborate on this point.
It is worth recalling that (in the scholastic framework) an agent counts as a
genuine cause of some eﬀect if (given all the necessary conditions required)
the eﬀect obtains because of the agent’s own nature.7 For instance, ﬁre is the
proper (or per se) cause of heat in other bodies because it belongs to the
nature of ﬁre to be hot and thus to produce heat in other bodies. Now,
assume that the defender of the traditional account maintains that ﬁnal caus-
ality is necessary for eﬃcient causality to work, insofar as it is in virtue of the
ﬁnal cause that the eﬃcient cause is determined to produce a certain eﬀect in
a certain way.8 Final causation plays a crucial role in this account because it
determines the end that a certain causal process is directed towards in the
ﬁrst place. It is ﬁnal causation (M2) that guides and rules the causal process.
In this scenario, if the agent by itself cannot account for the ﬁnal cause of a
6Suárez, for instance, maintains that natural agents lacking cognition are only improperly called ﬁnal
causes, since they can act for the sake of a certain end only insofar as they are guided by God. See
DM 23.10.6.
7See, for instance, Suárez DM, 17.2.2, in Suárez, On Eﬃcient Causality. Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18 and
19, 11.
8Concerning this point, see Penner, ‘Final Causality’.
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certain action (in the sense that its internal principle of change cannot direct
the action towards its end), then the same agent cannot be its eﬃcient cause
either. Whichever internal principle belongs to that agent, the eﬀect produced
does not obtain because of the agent’s own nature, which by itself is incapable
of accounting for the end towards which that eﬀect tends. Rather, it must be
some external principle that inclines the agent to produce that eﬀect in a
certain way and towards a certain end. Hence, if an agent cannot account
for the ﬁnal cause of some eﬀect (because the agent is directed by an external
agent to aim at a certain end), then it seems problematic to maintain that such
an agent can account for the same eﬀect as its eﬃcient cause. In this scenario,
the agent cannot determine itself (in virtue of the agent’s own nature, or per
se) to produce a certain eﬀect towards a certain end (because it is assumed
that the agent on its own cannot cognize that end), and thus the agent
cannot initiate the whole causal process towards that end.
A way out from this impasse consists in dismissing the interdependency
between eﬃcient and ﬁnal causation. However, this would mark a signiﬁcant
departure from the standard scholastic account of causation, in which
eﬃcient causation depends on ﬁnal causation. Ultimately, if eﬃcient causation
does not depend on ﬁnal causation, and if one assumes that eﬃcient causa-
tion is what is at stake in the art-nature distinction (M1), then it becomes pro-
blematic to maintain that all changes in physical beings tend to an end (M2),
because the changes associated with the agent as a natural being (M1) do not
depend on ﬁnal causation (M2). By divorcing eﬃcient and ﬁnal causation, the
late scholastic conception of physical reality is at risk of falling apart.
(b) Let me now consider the case of an author who, instead of striving to
maintain the late scholastic conception of physical reality, attempts to
change this model in order to accomodate the counterexample. This non tra-
ditional solution can be articulated in two main ways. The author may change
either the art-nature distinction (M1a-b) or the commitment to ﬁnal causality
in nature (M2).9 My hypothesis is that, in this scenario, it ismore likely that early
modern authors are willing to change the art-nature distinction (M1a-b) rather
than the idea that physical beings (including natural beings) operate for an
end (M2) or the cognition condition (M2a). This means that, when faced
with the couterexample of natural beings that do not cognize their ends
(e.g. plants), a non-traditional account would deny that having an internal
principle of change is necessary to qualify as a natural being (vs. M1a).
Before moving further, let me add two methodological disclaimers. First,
the conceptual change introduced by non traditional accounts of the art-
nature distinction (M1) may be articulated in diﬀerent ways and there is no
9Of course, an author may also simply reject the whole late scholastic conception of physical reality
altogether. However, in this case the author would not accomodate the model M with the counterex-
ample but would simply reject the model.
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need to assume a ‘one ﬁts all’ solution. For instance, some authors may use a
deﬁnition of ‘natural’ that does not rely on whether a physical being has an
internal principle of change, but rather on whether a being is produced by
human craft. Other authors might reduce the diﬀerence between natural
and artiﬁcial beings to a diﬀerence in the complexity of their form and struc-
ture, or even drop the art-nature distinction from the conception of physical
reality entirely. There seems to be no need to assume that all the authors sup-
porting non traditional views should endorse the same strategy (there is in
fact evidence that they did not, see Garber, ‘Remarks on the Pre-History of
the Mechanical Philosophy’). However, what they will all share is that they
are trying to change the late scholastic conception of physical reality by dis-
missing or signiﬁcantly altering one of its two main pillars (namely M1 or M2).
In this sense, my model is a helpful heuristic guide to grouping together
otherwise diﬀerent non traditional accounts and focusing on the common
strategy they adopt to change the core features of the late scholastic con-
ception of physical reality. I do not propose to use my model to predict a
priori how these changes will be carried out or which speciﬁc new core
notions will be introduced. The function of my model, rather, is to direct
research focus towards those core features of the traditional model M that
are expected to change in non traditional accounts. How exactly this
change occurs and in what particular fashion are details that ought to be
clariﬁed by direct historical and textual examination.
Second, my hypothesis concerns the relative frequency with which this
reaction is instantiated compared to the whole array of authors who discuss
and engage with this topic. In this respect, my hypothesis does not mainly
concern the position of any individual author, but rather the pattern or histori-
cal trend that can be uncovered within a group of authors. My hypothesis can
be falsiﬁed if (a) the majority of historical authors are willing to maintain both
M1 and M2 (as if there were no conceptual tension between them), or (b) they
dismiss the idea that natural beings operate for an end (by altering M2), or (c)
if they dismiss the cognition condition (M2a) in order to dissipate the tension.
3. Corpus, procedure and results
3.1. Establishing the corpus
The hypothesis I presented in the previous section concerns a conceptual
change in the late scholastic conception of physical reality. The domain of
texts to look at in order to test this hypothesis should thus be such as to rep-
resent late scholastic views and study how they were transformed during the
early modern period. Late scholastic natural philosophy was mostly taught at
universities. Recent scholarship also acknowledges that early modern univer-
sities were laboratories for the constant adjustment and reshaping of
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traditional views (Sgarbi, The Aristotelian Tradition and the Rise of British Empiri-
cism) and for the dissemination of new approaches (Ariew, Descartes and the
First Cartesians; Ducheyne and van Besow, ‘Newton and the Dutch ‘Newto-
nians’: 1713–1750’). I have thus focused on university textooks and systematic
presentations of natural philosophy as the main domain for compiling my
corpus. Given the limitations of this study, I also restricted my geographical
focus to the Dutch universities only. Let me explain why this focus seemed
appropriate for my research.
Existing scholarship stresses that Dutch universities were incredibly
receptive towards new ideas while also determined to carry over more tra-
ditionally inspired scholastic curricula (Ruestow, Physics at Seventeenth- and
Eighteenth-Century Leiden; van Bunge, ‘Philosophy’). It has been discussed
how religious debates put pressure on leading Dutch universities to
develop new scholastic ‘protestant’ curricula (van Ruler, ‘Franco Petri Bur-
gersdijk and the case of Calvinism within the Neo-Scholastic Tradition’,
‘The Shipwreck of Belief and Eternal Bliss’; Leijenhorst and Lüthy, ‘The
Erosion of Aristotelianism’). While deeply inﬂuenced by leading (Catholic)
scholastic authors, this educational project was at the same time open to
inputs coming from the ‘new’ philosophy of Descartes and interested in
developing a Protestant agenda (e.g. Krop, ‘Medicine and Philosophy in
Leiden around 1700’). These circumstances determined Dutch professors
to develop rather eclectic and hybrid positions, which integrated both tra-
ditional late scholastic materials and new approaches developed by early
modern novatores. Hence, the Dutch universities oﬀer an ideal domain for
my study since it includes both innovative and more traditional elements.
Moreover, a corpus based on texts connected with universities (textbooks,
disputations, introductions, etc.) oﬀers a relatively high degree of homogen-
eity from both a linguistic and structural point of view that facilitates the
comparison and analysis of diﬀerent works.
To distil my corpus, I based my selection on the authors and works included
in the Dictionary of Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century Dutch Philosophers
(van Bunge et al., hereafter referred to as Dictionary). To ﬁlter the entries of
the Dictionary and compile the ﬁnal list of authors and works included in
my corpus, I applied the following four criteria:
(1) Language: Latin. For reasons of linguistic homogeneity, I restricted the
corpus of my research to texts written in Latin only.
(2) Genre: textbooks and systematic works. I included only those works that
were more general in scope, such as textbooks, introductions or sys-
tematic discussions of natural philosophy, and collections of disputations
on natural philosophy. I left out most of the texts focused on other scien-
tiﬁc disciplines (such as medicine) or on particular problems (such as the
mind-body relationship). The advantage of focusing on more systematic
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texts is that they do not primarily aim at engaging in controversies, but
rather attempt to oﬀer an up-to-date state of the discipline. This feature
of my corpus helps to more directly identify the position defended by
each author. I based my selection both on the keywords included in
the titles (e.g. ‘natural philosophy’, ‘physic’, and ‘philosophy’) and on
the bio-bibliographical information oﬀered in the Dictionary, which
often presents summaries of the content and character of the author’s
main works.
(3) Author-publications ratio: one publication per author. I included only one
title per author in order to reduce distortions in the results that might
depend on the over-representation of the position of a single author
due to the relatively greater availability of his publications. When more
than one work per author was available, I selected the title that ﬁt
better the other selection criteria listed here.
(4) Availability: Google Books. To have access to digitalized versions of these
texts, I relied on the rather large collection of these works that was avail-
able on Google Books (February 2017).
Based on these criteria, the ﬁnal list of texts that compose my corpus is the
following (see complete bibliographical details in the Dictionary):
Case Publication
Date
Title (shortened) Author’s surname Aﬃliation
A 1607 Partitiones physicae SNELLIUS Leiden
B 1613 Physicae, hoc est, naturalis philosophiae GUTBERLETH Deventer
C 1615 Institutiones physicae JACCHAEUS Leiden
D 1620 Exercitationes philosophicae GORLAEUS Leiden
E 1631 Idea philosophiae tum naturalis, tum
moralis
BURGERSDIJK Leiden
F 1644 Introductio ad physicam SENGUERD, A. Amsterdam
G 1645 Institutiones physicae KYPER Leiden
H 1646 Fundamenta physices REGIUS Utrecht
I 1650 Medulla physicae ISENDOORN Harderwijk
J 1651 Philosophia naturalis HOLWARDA Franeker
K 1651 Commentaria physica De MEY Middelburg
L 1653 Disputatio physica De BRUYN Utrecht
M 1654 Philosophia naturalis, moralis, rationalis HEEREBOORD Leiden
N 1654 Clavis philosophiae naturalis De RAEY Leiden
O 1660 Physica generalis SCHOOCK Groningen
P 1664 Physica CLAUBERG Groningen
Q 1671 Institutiones physicae GREYDANUS Franeker
R 1680 Philosophia naturalis SENGUERD, W. Leiden
S 1681 Disputationes philosophicae De VOLDER Leiden
T 1688 Compendium physicae
(ed. C. LANGENHERT)
GEULINCX Leiden
U 1695 Physica sive de rebus corporeis Le CLERC Amsterdam
V 1710 Syntagma theologico-physico-
metaphysicum
ANDALA Franeker
W 1727 Principia philosophiae naturalis ODÉ Utrecht
X 1736 Introductio ad philosophiam, metaphysicam
et logicam continens
’s GRAVESANDE Leiden
Y 1748 Institutiones physicae Van
MUSSCHENBROEK
Utrecht
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Let me add three remarks to this list.
First, although these titles represent only a relatively small selection of the
long list of broadly relevant authors and titles that might be considered in a
more ambitious and large-scale investigation,10 they oﬀer an almost complete
list with respect to authors of Latin textbooks or systematic treatises in natural
philosophy during this period.11
Second, chronologically speaking, the corpus spans from 1607 to 1748,
with a certain concentration of titles in the central decades of the seventeenth
century. This concentration does not necessarily introduce a bias since the
period coincides with the ﬁrst spreading of the Cartesian philosophy in the
Dutch Republic. Independently of whether the higher number of publications
produced in these decades is positively correlated with the debates surround-
ing Cartesian philosophy, it is relevant for the purposes of this current study to
examine the texts from that period.
Third, this corpus does not create any obvious expectations about the
validity of my working hypothesis. Since the corpus includes many
authors who were close to scholastic positions (cases A, B, C, E, F, G, I-M),
it does not suggest that ‘new’ mechanist positions will be dominant at all.
The corpus also includes a number of Cartesian-friendly authors (cases H,
N, P, S, T). It would be expected that these authors reject the cognition con-
dition (M2a) or are silent on it (in line with Descartes’ own rather dismissive
attitude towards discussions of teleology in physics). Should this be the
case, they would falsify my hypothesis (which assumes that authors tend
to accept the cognition condition while rejecting the traditional art-nature
distinction). Finally, insofar as the corpus includes a number of eight-
eenth-century texts (cases U-Y), it might be expected that they will show
a decline of discussion of the art-nature distinction (which is very much
entrenched within the late scholastic framework that should no longer be
expected to be of much relevance in the eighteenth century). Given these
considerations, the corpus does not suggest that the veriﬁcation of my
hypothesis is an obvious outcome.
10Based on the information contained in the Dictionary, approximately 89 authors and 235 titles would be
relevant for broader research on the evolution of natural philosophy in general (and on the concept of
‘nature’ in particular) in the seventeenth and eighteenth-century Dutch context. The great majority of
these texts are in Latin, although a few of them are in Dutch and French. At the time when I conducted
this survey (February 2017), 69 authors and 136 titles out of this long-list were available online on
Google Books.
11Only six authors writing this genre of works are not included in my corpus because their works were not
digitally available on Google Books when I conducted the inventory. These six authors are Gerard (1604–
50) and Arnold (1606–53) Bootius (co-authors), Nicolaus Engelhard (1696–1765), Johannes Schulerus
(1619–74), Rutger van Loenen (1623/4–72), Arnoldus Verhel (1583–1664), and Daniel Voet (1629–60).
See bio-bibliographical details in the Dictionary.
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3.2. Procedure for testing the hypothesis
In order to analyse the corpus, I combined an algorithmically-planned pro-
cedure with close reading. On the one hand, I used the model described in
section two to design three queries that guided the analysis of each text of
the corpus. On the other hand, I assessed the results of these queries by
close reading of selected excerpts from each text.
Based on model M, I designed the following three queries:
Q1: does the text deny the cognition condition (M2a)?
Q2: does the text deny that natural beings have an internal principle of change
(M1a)?
Q3: does the text deny the art-nature distinction (M1a-b)?
Let me brieﬂy explain why these three queries are suitable to check my
working hypothesis. The three queries are formulated in a negative way
because my goal is to investigate a conceptual change occurring in the late
scholastic conception of physical reality (as modelled by M). In all these
queries, by ‘denial’, I mean that the relevant core notions in the model are dis-
missed or changed, or that the author argues that some of the conditions
included in model M should be discarded. My working hypothesis supposes
a relatively stronger tendency among early modern authors towards accept-
ing the cognition condition (thus answering ‘no’ to Q1) while rejecting the
idea that natural beings have an internal principle of change (thus answering
‘yes’ to Q2) and the traditional art-nature distinction (thus answering ‘yes’ to
Q3 as well).
For each query, I attribute the following values:
+1= ‘Yes’
+0,5 = Not explicit, but probably ‘Yes’
0 =Missing evidence
−0,5 = Not explicit, but probably ‘No’
−1= ‘No’
This table of values is intended to allow a certain degree of ﬂexibility in
assessing results. I do not expect that all the relevant passages will be
detected. An obvious reason for this is that a speciﬁc text might simply not
deal with the relevant concept(s). Another more technical reason might be
that, given the often low quality of the OCR used for this study, the search
for keywords associated with each model could not capture all the relevant
instances. However, this problem is somewhat compensated for by the fact
that I do not focus on the frequency of words or concepts within a single
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text. Rather, I take one instance in the whole text to be suﬃcient to answer the
query for that text considered as a unit. My assumption is that, if a relevant
notion is discussed more than once, the procedure should be able to
capture at least one of its occurrences. Also, a close reading might reveal
only indirect or implicit support to answer aﬃrmatively or negatively to a
speciﬁc query. This ‘indirect’ support is assessed on the basis of interpretation
and contextual reconstruction that goes obviously beyond a bare keywords
search. For instance, I discarded occurrences of keywords that where
framed in the context of quotes from other texts or refutations of other
authors, and thus were not representative of the ideas of the author of the
text under analysis. Although sometimes an explicit answer to a query is
missing, diﬀerent related passages can be taken to be indicative of the
author’s position.
The procedure I implemented to analyse each case of the corpus was
articulated as four steps. For each query, the whole procedure was iterated
in the same way. Cases were analysed in chronological order. The procedure
is the following:
Step 0. Deﬁning the working dictionary used for the search: keywords are
assigned to core and marginal notions involved in the query. The dictionary is
adjusted at each new iteration based on previous cases examined.12
Step 1. Retrieval of the text (conducted online on Google books).
Step 2. Concordancing of the core terms (taken as keywords) with their marginal
terms (taken as context words).
Step 3. Locating the textual excerpts that most explicitly appear to verify or
falsify each query. Double-check occurrences of the key terms to verify
whether the text contains any further passage that conveys a diﬀerent
meaning or position (these diﬀerent meanings are taken into account in step 4).
Step 4. Assessing, by means of close reading, whether the excerpts answer the
query positively or negatively.
Before implementing this procedure on my corpus, I tested it in two paradig-
matic cases. This allowed me to compare the results obtained by my method
and those which ought to be expected in light of existing scholarship. Using
these two test cases I also designed a spectrum of possible scenarios in which
the cases included in my corpus could be classiﬁed.
12The dictionary I generated for this study is presented in the Appendix. However, larger-scale studies that
incorporate more advanced techniques would beneﬁt from balancing this top-down approach with
bottom-up methods and so enhancing the appropriateness of the working dictionary and the possibility
for serendipitous discovery. See, on this point, Betti and van den Berg, ‘Modelling the History of Ideas’.
New digital tools are currently under development for the reconstruction and study of conceptual voca-
bulary: see van Wierst et al., ‘Phil@Scale’; De Bolla et al., ‘Distributional Concept Analysis’.
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3.3. Test cases and spectrum deﬁnition
Betti and van den Berg (‘Towards a Computational History of Ideas’) argue that
models need to be preliminarily tested against the results obtained by tra-
ditional scholarship in order to secure the meaningfulness of the results
that they produce. I agree with this methodological recommendation. To
test my model, I implemented it in the case of two speciﬁc authors: Suárez
and Descartes. They are not part of my corpus, but there is signiﬁcant scholarly
consensus about their relevance for shaping the debate among Dutch univer-
sity professors (which constitute the main population of my study).
Suárez is recognized as one of the most inﬂuential late scholastic auth-
orities, especially for early modern authors (Carraud, Causa sive ratio,
Hattab, Descartes on Forms and Mechanisms). Moreover, there is evidence
that his works shaped Dutch early modern scholasticism too (van Ruler,
‘Franco Petri Burgersdijk and the case of Calvinism within the Neo-Scholastic
Tradition’). On the contrary, Descartes is one of the iconic ﬁgures usually
associated with the Scientiﬁc Revolution and the mechanization of nature.
Moreover, it is also widely acknowledged that Descartes’ thought was
widely debated in the Dutch Republic (Schmaltz, Early Modern Cartesianisms).
I used these two authors as representative of ‘traditional’ views (Suárez) and
‘non traditional’ views (Descartes). It goes without saying that labels such as
‘traditional’ and ‘non traditional’ are here employed only as conventional
shorthand and bear no normative value.
I analysed Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations and Descartes’ Principles of
Philosophy. The results I obtained can be summarized as follows:
Suárez:13 Q1 =−1; Q2 =−1; Q3 =−1
Descartes:14 Q1 = 0; Q2 = +1; Q3= +1
Results obtained in Suárez’s case conﬁrm that he defends the traditional late
scholastic conception of physical reality introduced at the beginning of
section two. The fact that Q1 receives a negative answer means that Suárez
is committed to the cognition condition (M2a). The fact that Q2 and Q3
receive negative answers entails that Suárez does not dismiss the traditional
notion of nature as having an internal principle of change (M1a) and that
he does not blur the art-nature distinction (M1a-b). Results obtained in the
case of Descartes regarding Q2 and Q3 conﬁrm that he rejects the traditional
idea of nature (vs. M1a) and explicitly reduces natural beings to a kind of arti-
ﬁcial being (vs. M1a-b). In the text considered, Descartes does not explicitly
13References for results (DM= Metaphysical Disputations, in Opera, voll. 25–26): Q1, see DM23.7.2 (value
−1); Q2 see DM23.10.3 (value −1); Q3 see DM15.2.8 (value −1).
14References for results (PP= Principles of Philosophy, in Oeuvres, vol. 8): Q1, see PP I.28 (value 0); Q2 see PP
II.37 (value +1); Q3 see PP IV.203 (value +1).
BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 61
dismiss the cognition condition, nor does he accept it (so the text is not con-
clusive concerning M2a).15
Given the setting of the investigation, results can be presented in two ways.
First, it is possible to simply represent the results for each query obtained in
each case. Second, it is possible to calculate an ‘absolute’ result for each
case, which is the arithmetic sum of the results obtained by the three
queries. This absolute result can be used to represent how the case under
scrutiny is located in a spectrum. The absolute results for my two test cases
are the following:
Suárez: (Q1 =−1) + (Q2 =−1) + (Q3 =−1) =−3
Descartes: (Q1 = 0) + (Q2 = +1) + (Q3= +1) = +2
Taking Suárez and Descartes as test cases, it is possible to suppose that a full-
blown mechanist would also explicitly deny M2a (Q1=+1), and thus would
assume an absolute value close to + 3. This value would locate full-blown
mechanism at the opposite of Suárez’s position on the spectrum of possible
conceptual options. However, more positions can be envisaged between
Suárez and Descartes assuming that only one query is positive, or that two
queries are positive and one negative. Cases in which only one query is posi-
tive bear greater resemblance with the traditional late scholastic conception
of physical reality, although they also entail some alteration of it. For this
reason, I label them ‘Eccentric Late Scholasticism’ (in the sense of non-stan-
dard). Cases in which two queries are positive suggest that only a few
aspects of the traditional scenario remain in place, although they do not
fully depart from it. I label these cases ‘Moderate Mechanism’.
The table here below summarizes how the diﬀerent combinations of
answers to each query delineate diﬀerent scenarios. I present here only
clear-cut values, but I shall treat non-integer values (±0,5) depending on
their positive or negative connotation.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Absolute Value Scenario Relation to WH
−1 −1 −1 −3 Traditional Late Scholasticism (Suárez’s case) No relevant change
+1 −1 −1 −1 Eccentric Late Scholasticism A No relevant change
−1 +1 −1 −1 Eccentric Late Scholasticism B Conﬁrms WH
−1 −1 +1 −1 Eccentric Late Scholasticism C Conﬁrms WH
−1 +1 +1 +1 Moderate Mechanism A Conﬁrms WH
+1 −1 +1 +1 Moderate Mechanism B Contrasts WH
+1 +1 −1 +1 Moderate Mechanism C Contrasts WH
0 +1 +1 +2 Cartesian Mechanism (Descartes’s case) Contrasts WH
+1 +1 +1 +3 Full-blown Mechanism Contrasts WH
15Schmaltz, ‘Descartes’ Critique of Scholastic Teleology’ argues that Descartes’ considered view in theMed-
itations remains closer to Aristotle and ultimately dismisses the cognition condition. Concerning Des-
cartes’ account see also Simmons, ‘Sensible Ends: Latent Teleology in Descartes’.
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My working hypothesis assumes that, over time, if Q1 is negative (i.e. the
author under examination does not deny the cognition condition), Q2 or
(inclusive) Q3 tend to assume positive values (i.e. the author denies that
natural beings have an internal principle of change, or he denies the art-
nature distinction as a whole). This means that authors that conﬁrm my
hypothesis fall into the Eccentric Late Scholasticism B and C (−1) and Moder-
ate Mechanism A (+1) scenarios. Authors that fall into the Moderate Mechan-
ism B or C scenarios or into Cartesian or Full-blown Mechanism scenarios
contrast my hypothesis because they deny that natural beings have internal
principles of change (M1a) or the art-nature distinction (M1a-b) without
accepting the cognition condition (M2a). My hypothesis would be veriﬁed if
the analysis of the corpus detects a relatively greater frequency of cases
that conﬁrm it, and it would be falsiﬁed in the case of a relatively greater fre-
quency of cases that contrast it.
3.4. Results obtained
My results are summarized in the following table (see the Appendix for textual
excerpts for each case):
Case Date Q1 Q2 Q3 Absolute result Scenario
A 1607 −0,5 −1 −1 −2,5 Traditional Late Scholasticism
B 1613 +0,5 −1 −1 −1,5 Eccentric Late Scholasticism A
C 1615 −1 −1 −1 −3 Traditional Late Scholasticism
D 1620 +0,5 −1 0 −0,5 Eccentric Late Scholasticism A
E 1631 −1 −1 −1 −3 Traditional Late Scholasticism
F 1644 −1 −1 −1 −3 Traditional Late Scholasticism
G 1645 −1 −1 −1 −3 Traditional Late Scholasticism
H 1646 −1 −1 +1 −1 Eccentric Late Scholasticism C
I 1650 +1 −1 −1 −1 Eccentric Late Scholasticism A
J 1651 −1 −1 +0,5 −1,5 Eccentric Late Scholasticism C
K 1651 −0,5 −1 −0,5 −2 Traditional Late Scholasticism
L 1653 −0,5 +1 +0,5 +1 Moderate Mechanism A
M 1654 −1 −1 −1 −3 Traditional Late Scholasticism
N 1654 −1 +1 +0,5 +0,5 Moderate Mechanism A
O 1660 −1 −1 −1 −3 Traditional Late Scholasticism
P 1664 −1 −0,5 +1 −0,5 Eccentric Late Scholasticism C
Q 1671 −0,5 +1 +0,5 +1 Moderate Mechanism A
R 1680 0 +1 +0,5 +1,5 Cartesian Mechanism
S 1681 −1 +1 +0,5 +0,5 Moderate Mechanism A
T 1688 −1 +1 +1 +1 Moderate Mechanism A
U 1695 −1 0 −1 −2 Traditional Late Scholasticism
V 1710 −1 +1 +0,5 +0,5 Moderate Mechanism A
W 1727 −0,5 −1 −0,5 −2 Traditional Late Scholasticism
X 1736 +0,5 +0,5 −0,5 +0,5 Moderate Mechanism C
Y 1748 +0,5 −0,5 −0,5 −0,5 Eccentric Late Scholasticism A
I shall analyse these results in three steps. I ﬁrst discuss the aggregate of
the absolute results, which only gives an impression of the absolute amount
of traditional versus non traditional positions in the whole corpus. Then, I
present the same absolute results in chronological order. These two ways
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of representing the results do not take into account the speciﬁc answers to
the diﬀerent queries. For this reason, these ways of representing the results
do not directly contribute to either verifying or falsifying my working
hypothesis. Nonetheless, they are interesting insofar as they provide an
overview of the degree of conceptual change that my approach detected
in the corpus and its distribution over time. Finally, I present the split
results for each query in order to check whether they verify or falsify my
working hypothesis.
The aggregate of the absolute results is presented in the following diagram
(Figure 1).
When Eccentric Late Scholasticism scenarios were included among non tra-
ditional scenarios, my model detected a high rate (60%) of non traditional
texts (i.e. cases in which absolute results are equal or above −1,5). This
suggests not only that the corpus includes both traditional and non traditional
cases, but also that the model and the procedure implemented are able to
detect and distinguish among them.
Figure 1 shows that the majority of authors who constitute the corpus
introduce at least some conceptual changes to the late scholastic conception
of physical reality. However, absolute results read without reference to chron-
ology cannot be used to analyse a conceptual drift, which occurs in time. If
distributed chronologically, the absolute results appear as in the following
diagram (Figure 2).
The diagram shows that the distribution between the traditional (lower
than −1,5) and non traditional (equal or higher than −1,5) approaches
Figure 1. Aggregate absolute results.
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varies signiﬁcantly over time. Traditional approaches were dominant in the
ﬁrst half of the seventeenth century (cases A-G), then they became a minority
in the second half of the century (cases H-U), and ﬁnally an exception in the
ﬁrst half of the eighteenth century (cases V-Y). This result shows that, despite
the ‘continuity’ with the previous period defended by some current scholar-
ship, early modern natural philosophy demonstrates a progressive decline
of traditional positions, at least as far as the late scholastic conception of phys-
ical reality is concerned.
The analysis of the split results obtained for each query suggests further
insights. Consider the next diagram (Figure 3).
There are only ﬁve cases (B, D, I, X and Y) in which Q1 has a positive value,
namely, in which the cognition condition (M2a) is denied. The diagram shows
that the great majority of cases (76%) uphold the cognition condition. This
means that, independently of how traditional or non traditional each case
might be, the acceptance of the cognition condition remains relatively con-
stant across the whole corpus.
The acceptance of the cognition condition does not necessarily entail a dis-
missal of the art-nature distinction. However, when such a dismissal emerges
(cases H, J, L, N, P, Q, R, S, T, V, and X, namely 44% of the whole corpus) it is
signiﬁcantly more frequently associated (82% of the cases in which the art-
nature distinction is dismissed) with cases in which the cognition condition
is in place (cases H, J, L, N, P, Q, S, T and V). Only rarely (cases R and X), a
Figure 2. Absolute results over time.
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rejection of the art-nature distinction occurs together with a denial (or simply
a bracketing) of the cognition condition. This outcome is in line with what my
hypothesis predicted.
The following diagram (Figure 4) provides further support to my hypothesis
by showing the relative number of cases per scenario based on absolute
results.
As mentioned in the previous section, my hypothesis is veriﬁed if the great-
est number of non traditional cases falls within the Eccentric Late Scholasti-
cism B and C or Moderate Mechanism A scenarios. As the diagram shows,
this is in fact the case.
The implementation of the model approach oﬀers a new way of quantify-
ing and studying elements of continuity and discontinuity between late scho-
lastic and early modern natural philosophy. My results support the idea that
there is some signiﬁcant discontinuity between early modern natural philos-
ophy and the traditional understanding of the art-nature distinction, since
they indicate that this traditional position gets progressively marginalized
during the period. Nonetheless, they also show that this transformation is sup-
ported ‘from within’ the traditional framework. Insofar as authors were com-
mitted to preserving the cognition condition (M2a), the acceptance of a
new ‘mechanical’ understanding of nature (which rejects at least part of
M1) became a viable solution to the problem nestled in the late scholastic
conception of physical reality (M).
Figure 3. Split queries results.
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Beforemoving any further, letme defuse amajor (plausible) objection tomy
interpretation of the results that I collected. The fact that the cognition con-
dition (M2a) remains quite constantly upheld across the corpus might be inter-
preted as a sign that it is some sort of left over from the late scholastic tradition.
While other elements (the idea that natural beings have an internal principle of
change and the art-nature distinction) change, that particular aspect of the tra-
ditional framework (M2a) simply remains in place. After all, conceptual change
does not have to be radical or abrupt and there might be conceptual elements
that are more resistant to alteration. On this basis, one might contend that the
results I obtained concerning Q1 do not necessarily mean that the change in
the art-nature distinction conceptually depends on the cognition condition for
the reasons suggested by my working hypothesis. The cognition condition
might be a background claim that is not aﬀected (for whatever other
reasons) by such a change. In other words, one might object that the dismissal
of the traditional art-nature distinction (M1a-b) is conceptually independent
from the acceptance of the cognition condition (M2a).
In this study, however, I did not randomly pick two elements and then
claim that they are conceptually dependent on the basis of my results. Both
the cognition condition (M2) and the art-nature distinction (M1a-b) are an
integral component of the late scholastic conception of physical reality as I
presented it in section two. My hypothesis can be proved to be wrong by
showing that the trend it supposes (i.e. that authors are more likely to
dismiss the art-nature distinction than the cognition condition) does not
Figure 4. Absolute results per scenario.
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capture an actual historical pattern in the corpus. For instance, the examin-
ation of the texts might have shown that historical authors rather tended to
dismiss the cognition condition (as foreseen in the Moderate Mechanism B
and C scenarios). Some existing scholarship maintains, in fact, that the dismis-
sal of the art-nature distinction goes hand in hand with the dismissal of the
use of teleological arguments and ﬁnal causes in the natural domain
(Shapin, The Scientiﬁc Revolution, 135–161; Gaukroger, The Emergence of a
Scientiﬁc Culture, 457–471). However, my analysis reveals that this is not the
most prevalent attitude in the corpus I examined (although it is not completely
absent either, see cases R and X).
The topic of the deﬁnition of nature and that of ﬁnal causes were not remote
andmutually independent provinces in the system of natural philosophy. Aris-
totle himself introduced both in the very ﬁrst chapters of the second book of his
Physics. The whole commentary tradition that followed was very well aware of
the conceptual connection between these two topics. It is thus historically and
philosophically plausible to expect that the discussion of what allows agents to
act for an end also aﬀects the discussion of what a natural being is and how it
operates. I do acknowledge that historical authors might not have phrased the
conceptual tension that I discussed in this study as explicitly as I presented it in
mymodel. However, making explicit conceptual implications that are arguably
nestled (and otherwise overlooked) in historical materials is one of the chief
tasks of the historian and, in this respect, the model approach is a resourceful
methodological tool to achieve it.
4. Agenda for future research
This study aimed to show both the fruitfulness and the feasibility of the
implementation of the model approach in the domain of the history of
early modern philosophy and science. In conclusion, let me point out three
main ways in which my initial results corroborate this contention.
First, my study shows that the model approach does indeed have the
potential to extend the validity of historical hypotheses to corpora that
have not been fully investigated yet by existing scholarship (such as the
authors I considered for this study). This point is particularly important.
Today there is a growing debate about the issues raised by the canon
of Western philosophy and its inclusiveness and representativeness
(Shapiro, ‘Revisiting the Early Modern Philosophical Canon’; Beaney,
‘Twenty-Five Years of the British Journal for the History of Philosophy’).
The methodology used by philosophers and historians has an impact on
their ability to overcome the narrowness of the established Western
canon. Traditional research in the history of philosophy and science is
mostly based on close reading. Despite its strengths (such as philosophical
and philological accuracy, ﬁne-grained analysis and historical sensibility),
68 A. SANGIACOMO
close reading alone makes it diﬃcult to study and investigate large and
still unstudied corpora. Moreover, close reading requires framing the rel-
evance of individual cases within broader narratives (Henry, ‘Essay
Review. The Scientiﬁc Revolution’, 817). Yet these narratives are most com-
monly based on generalizations drawn from small-scale inquiries. These
small-scale inquiries are often based on the interpretation of canonical
or already well-researched ﬁgures. What’s more, such inquiries often do
not make clear how and to what extent they are representative of
broader historical trends. For this reason, close reading by itself raises
the risk of unduly subsuming not-yet studied ﬁgures within already estab-
lished narratives inspired by more canonical texts and authors.
The model approach is a good antidote to the risks and limitations of
relying on close reading alone. The hypothesis I aimed to conﬁrm (i.e.
that acceptance of the cognition condition is positively correlated with a
greater likelihood of dismissing the art-nature distinction) was at odds
with the established narrative about the seventeenth-century mechaniza-
tion of nature (according to which early modern novatores would dismiss
both the art-nature distinction and the cognition condition). Initial expec-
tations about the composition of my corpus suggested that results would
in fact have contradicted my hypothesis. And yet, the use of the model
approach lent support to my hypothesis. In this respect, the model
approach challenges the way in which historians project their expectations
on not-yet-studied corpora on the basis of the case studies with which
they are already familiar.
Second, the model approach conﬁrms some of the results obtained by tra-
ditional scholarship concerning the early modern ‘mechanization’ of nature,
especially the fact that early modern constructions are better understood
against the background of late scholastic thought (Hattab, Descartes on
Forms and Mechanisms; Sgarbi, The Aristotelian Tradition and the Rise of
British Empiricism). However, my results also call for a more balanced rethink-
ing of the discontinuities between this late scholastic background and the
early modern developments of natural philosophy. While my study conﬁrms
that it is diﬃcult to sharply oppose traditional and innovative authors, it
also shows that around the mid-seventeenth century certain important
tenets of the traditional scholastic framework got progressively rejected or
transformed. Today’s scholarship (Garber, ‘Remarks on the Pre-History of the
Mechanical Philosophy’, ‘Why the Scientiﬁc Revolution Wasn’t a Scientiﬁc
Revolution, and Why It Matters’) oﬀers a wealth of evidence of the fact that
traditional scholastic views were under attack on many diﬀerent fronts and
in many diﬀerent ways. Nonetheless, my results suggest that preferences
were not equally distributed across all the possible philosophical positions
and scenarios but that some alternatives had signiﬁcantly more followers
than others. The model approach brings an interesting historical and
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philosophical layer to this investigation by raising the following urgent
research questions: why did historical authors accept certain transformations
in the traditional framework instead of others? Why did they prefer to pre-
serve certain tenets (e.g. the cognition condition) instead of others (e.g. the
art-nature distinction)?
Consider again, for instance, the distribution of cases per scenario captured
in Figure 4. This result is somewhat puzzling insofar as it shows that 7 out of 17
cases that could be broadly described as late scholastic are not aligned with
the most traditional version of the late scholastic position. Eccentric Late Scho-
lasticism A (4 instances) denies the cognition condition, thus showing the sur-
vival of positions that are in fact closer to that of Aristotle himself in the early
modern period. Eccentric Late Scholasticism C (3 cases) instantiates a some-
what bizarre hybrid view, in which the art-nature distinction is weakened
while the general understanding of nature is not. From a merely conceptual
point of view, this position is puzzling because it is seemingly inconsistent.
Yet it should provoke historians to further investigate why this form of
Eccentric Late Scholasticism was favoured over its parallel alternative
(Eccentric Late Scholasticism B), which has not been detected at all in the
corpus considered here. Looking at authors who defended versions of a
mechanical natural philosophy, it would be worth investigating why, from a
historical point of view, Moderate Mechanism A (rather than its rival scenarios)
aggregated most of the consensus. In this respect, the model approach is a
powerful heuristic tool which can be used to further investigate the
genuine complexities of historical debates.
Third, since the model approach draws attention to the frequencywith which
certain views are instantiated in a given corpus, it calls for the use ofmore reﬁned
quantitative tools capable of analysing this frequency and identifying patterns in
the spreading and transformation of ideas across time and space. There is no
question that historians and philosophers should continue to practice and culti-
vate close reading. However, I have argued that the model approach can signiﬁ-
cantly enhance and complement close reading and more traditional
methodological approaches. How to best develop this suggestion remains an
open topic for future investigations and trials. It would be necessary to develop
strategies to study how certain positions become progressively accepted and
regarded as standard or ‘normal’ positions within certain communities. It
would also be crucial to ﬁnd ways to assess the socio-political factors that
shaped these patterns and study the co-evolution of social and conceptual
elements. While the model approach, by itself, does not solve these problems,
it forcefully draws attention to their importance for a better and more nuanced
understanding of the complex historical dynamics that shaped the emergence
of early modern natural philosophy. In turn, developing tools for dealing with
these problems would lead to a better integration of quantitative approaches
in the toolkit of the historians of early modern philosophy and science.
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